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RECENT LEGISLATION
Recent Legislation
JUVENILE COURTS - PROSECUTION OF DELINQUENT UNDER
CRIMINAL STATUTES.-A Missouri statute contains the follow-
ing provisions: In the discretion of the judge of any court hav-
ing jurisdiction of delinquent children under the provisions of
Art. 6, Ch. 21, or Art. 5, Ch. 11, R. S. 1919, any petition alleging
a child to be delinquent may be dismissed and such child prose-
cuted under the general law, and any motion, petition, or appli-
cation made to any court or judge having general jurisdiction of
criminal causes to transfer the charge against any delinquent
child to a court having jurisdiction of delinquent children may
be denied in the discretion of the judge, when in the judgment
of the judge such child is not a proper subject to be dealt with
under the reformatory provisions. Laws 1927, p. 129.
Prior to the passage of the above statute, a jury trial as found
in criminal proceedings was only as a result of the demand of
the delinquent child or of his parents or guardian. The present
act creates a further possibility of jury trial by virtue of the dis-
cretionary power vested in a judge. Where such power is exer-
cised, the child is treated as any other citizen who has committed
a similar offense.
The right to demand a trial by jury may be traced to Laws
1911, p. 177, now to be found in R. S. 1919, sec. 2592. Circuit
courts in counties of over 50,000 population were given original
jurisdiction of all proceedings involving neglected or delinquent
children. The practice and procedure prescribed by law for
the conduct of criminal cases were prescribed in cases in which
children are charged with conduct which constitutes a violation
of the criminal statutes, provided a jury trial were demanded.
In all other cases the proceedings were to be informal.
Laws 1913, pp. 148-154, conferred similar jurisdiction upon
probate courts in counties of less than 50,000. The proceedings
under this act were similar to those authorizing the appointment
of guardians for minors. No provision was made for a jury
trial even in the event that it should be demanded. This act was
declared unconstitutional in State ex rel. Cave v. Tineher (1914),
258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028. The decision was based partly upon
constitutional provisions, fixing the jurisdiction of probate
courts and partly upon the ground that the failure to provide
for optional criminal proceedings was in violation of the guar-
anty of jury trial contained in Const. Mo., Art. 2, secs. 22, 28.
The act was therefore repealed by Laws 1917, p. 197, now to
be found in R. S. 1919, sec. 1136, which is similar to see. 2592,
supra, with the further provision, however, that the judge might,
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in his discretion, order a delinquent child prosecuted under the
general law.
An amendment raising the maximum age of children subject
to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, was made to R. S. 1919, sec.
1136, by Laws 1923, p. 131. Under the new law, as under the
old, a discretionary power was allowed to the judge in remand-
ing a delinquent child for criminal prosecution in counties of
less than 50,000 population, but a similar power could not be
exercised in counties of more than 50,000 population. The re-
sult was a declaration of the unconstitutionality of this feature
of the law in the case of State v. Gregori (1928), 2 S. W. (2d)
747, reaffirmed in State v. Damico (1928), 4 S. W. (2d) 425.
To relieve this situation the act of 1927, as quoted above, was
passed. Thus discretionary power is allotted to the judges in
both types of counties.
R. S. 1919, sec. 2596, provides that a child shall be taken di-
rectly before a juvenile court or the case transferred to such
court. Sec. 2598 further provides that no court is deprived of
the power to file complaints and issue warrants for the arrest of
delinquents, but all subsequent proceedings shall be in a juvenile
court. Similar provisions may be found in sec. 1136.
Juvenile court statutes are upheld upon the theory that the
delinquent child is not on trial for the commission of a crime,
and the reformatory to which he is committed is a place where
reformation and not punishment is the end sought to be obtained.
provision for jury trial is usually held to be unnecessary. Cmw.
v. Fisher, 213 Pa. St. 48, 62 A. 198, 5 Ann. Cas. 192. The con-
trary holding in State v. Tincher, supra, is greatly weakened by
subsequent decisions. State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner (1923),
300 Mo. 359, 254 S. W. 179; State v. Porterfield (1924), 264 S.
W. 386.
A perusal of state laws will indicate their wide variance. Under
the Juvenile Court law of California, Leering's Gen. Laws 1923,
Act 3966, sec. 6, original jurisdkid;k1 over delinquents under
eighteen lies with the juvenile court and discretionary power is
given to the judge to either try the case or submit it to a regular
court for criminal prosecution. People iv. Wolff (1920), 182
Cal. 728, 190 P. 22. It will be seen that this act is very similar
to the one in force in Missouri. The statutes of Kansas give ex-
clusive jurisdiction of juvenile delinquents to the probate courts
and prosecutions in any other court are absolutely void. Ex
parte Swehla (1923), 114 Kan. 712, 220 P. 299. Under a proper
construction of the conflicting provisions of Iowa Code 1927,
secs. 3617, 3618, 3619, 3632, 3634, 3636, the juvenile court does
not have exclusive jurisdiction of a child under eighteen charged
with offenses punishable other than by life imprisonment or
death, but where the indictment is returned or information
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filed in district court, it need not submit the matter to the juve-
nile court before proceeding under the indictment. State v.
Reed (1928), 218 N. W. 609. Under the Laws Wis. 1927, sec.
48.01, C. 4, jury trial may be demanded or ordered by the judge.
Discretionary power is vested in the judge to transfer a case to a
criminal court under the provisions of Ala. Crim. Code 1923,
sec. 3540; Carroll's Ky. Stat., 6th Ed., 1922, sec. 3315; and N. C.
Code 1927, secs. 5039, 5040.
Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, p. 37, gives a
brief summary of present day American law. The author con-
cludes: "Although the validity of this discretionary power con-
ferred upon a judge has been upheld, the author feels that such
practice is objectionable and subject to abuse."
Such discretionary power, however, should not be objection-
able. Doubtless cases are presented where moral decadence
has reached such an advanced stage that efforts at reformation
would be fruitless. C. R. S., '30.
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